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the court of appeals determined the relative priority of mechanics' liens
and the United States general lien for taxes assessed after the first work
performed by the materialmen. The probate court had determined that
the mechanics' liens (four in number) had priority over the tax liens of
the United States which all attached later than the commencement of
work. In -reversing the decision of the probate court, the court of appeals
assumed that mechanics' liens had not become choate in the federal
sense before the tax liens attached. The court concluded that the mechanics' liens were not within the favored class against which priority
dates only from the filing of the federal lien and therefore granted the
federal -tax lien priority over these inchoate mechanics' liens.
MAURICE S. CULP

TORTS
Traffic Victims1
If an Ohio lawyer wanted evidence supporting a currently mounting
feeling that traffic cases need to be handled in a special way, he could
find it in a few of the cases reported last year.
Laughlin v. City of Cleveland2 is a case in point. A reading of both
majority and dissenting opinions shows what is really true of almost all
cases: the considerable difficulty in determining what actually happened.
The collision between plaintiff's car and defendant's bus apparently was
known to have occurred in a five point intersection controlled by traffic
lights as well as stop signs. Both parties were held under the circumstances to have equal rights to enter the intersection. Of course, both
parties claimed to have proceeded with caution. Now it is up to a jury
to determine if one or the other or both drove negligently. Clearly, such
a "fact" cannot be determined scientifically. If only there could be an
end to two-valued thinking, liable or not liable, all or nothing, a judge
could be allowed in such a case to decide that apportionment of damages
was the only answer. Unfortunately, there are presently no strong pressure groups to sponsor such a cause before the Ohio legislature.
Of course, pressure groups do sponsor other kinds of legislation. Certain insurance company groups are known to have sponsored -the various
guest statutes across the country. But the Ohio Supreme Court seems
1. The phrase is pilfered from Leon Green's recent work of the same name, a work
which should be read by every lawyer as a matter of general education. See a review
of the book in 10 WEST. REs. L. REv. 186 (1959).
2. 148 N.E.2d 347 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
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in one instance to have forgotten how such legislation gets on the books.
In Lombardo v. DeShazce3 a passenger, who claimed to be so intoxicated
that she did not know what she was doing, -was held to be a "guest" rider
so that she could recover in her suit for personal injuries only by proving
the wilfuilness or wantonness of the host defendant. Plaintiff had argued,
plausibly enough, that she could not be a "guest" if she did not know
enough to accept the proffered hospitality. Some states had taken just
this view in the analagous situation of child-passengers. The rationale
offered -by the court for its decision was that guest statutes were passed to
avoid the spectre of one person accepting the kindness or hospitality of
another and suing for "mere' negligence. This kind of reasoning makes
for hard chewing in this day of rapidly changing views on the traffic
problem. I choose to -believe that the judges on this court were speaking
euphemistically. There are a number of situations in which one person
may accept another person's hospitality and then sue him for mere negligence.4 Furthermore, the average reasonable and hospitable driver is not
going to be offended by such a suit because he will have adequate insurance coverage. Of course the insurance companies will care. Admittedly,
a different result might encourage the collusion the guest statute was designed to prevent. However, the judges on this particular court chose
not to discuss these more significant facets of the case.
Yet there are times when the court does allow itself to be visibly
affected by the insurance back drop of personal injury litigation.5 There
will be more and more of this kind of realism. Indeed, the day is foreseeable when automobile cases and a great many other so-called tort cases
may be handled by a law school in its class on Insurance. In this respect, consider Brewer v. DeCant.8 Plaintiff had been hit by a car purchased by one DeCant. Under the law of sales, the "tide" had passed
from the used car dealer to DeCant. Formerly it would have followed
that complete responsibility for the car was in DeCant. In Ohio, however, the law of sales is Conditioned in automobile transactions by the
Certificate of Tide Act. 7 Therefore, since the dealer had not satisfied
all the technical requirements of the Act, the certificate of tide was still
3. 167 Ohio St. 431, 149 N.E.2d 914 (1958), see also 10 WEST. RES.

L. REV.
312 (1959).
4. Consider, for instance, the greater spectre of an ungrateful person suing the good
samaritan expert on first aid for the latter's negligence.
5. One of the outstanding recent examples was Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165
Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956), removing the immunity of charitable hospitals for the torts of their servants.
6. 167 Ohio St. 411, 149 N.E.2d 166 (1958). See discussion in INSURANCE and
SALES sections, supra.
7.

O-mo REv. CODE § 4505.04.
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in the dealer's name. The result was that DeCant was liable but that
the dealer's insurance company was the ultimate obligor. The doctrine is
sound enough. The result will probably seem sound, too, at least to
plaintiffs' attorneys as well as those who believe in spreading the risk of
traffic accidents over larger groups. It is highly unlikely that there was
any other insurance covering this car at the time of the accident. It will
be interesting to see if dealers and their insurers in any way change their
marketing practices.
Up for the second time was Lehman v. Haynam.8 Plaintiff had sued
defendant for damages inflicted when defendant's automobile crossed over
the center line of the highway to collide with plaintiff's car. On the
first appeal, the supreme court had allowed defendant to raise the defense
of unforeseeable unconsciousness. The second appeal brought a new
trial because of unfairness in the previous trial, but the court in passing
established that the defendant need not prove exactly why he -blacked out.
His testimony alone to the effect that he did black out will make a jury
case.
Proof that the driver who strikes from the rear will likely pay comes
from Beauchamp v. B.&L Motor Freight, Inc.9 The defendant carrier
owned and operated a tractor-trailer which had defective brakes. The
operator took the tractor into a nearby mechanic who "repaired" them.
Subsequently the outfit ran into a car, causing an accordion action and
damage to several cars ahead in the line. The several drivers sued defendant. The court held that the general inference of negligence arising
from such a rear-end collision had not been sufficiently rebutted to keep
the case from the jury, particularly since there was still a question for the
jury as to whether the driver had been negligent in his selection of a
mechanic. The decision at least proves that there are various ways to
get a case to a jury.
Distributed Injuries
The most prevalent concern of the law of torts is with injuries which
arise out of the complex aspects of our technological activities. One discernible pattern in these activities is that of automobile traffic. Another
such pattern arises out of the manufacturing-distributing-purchasing-consuming complex together with what we might appropriately call distributed injuries. For this reason, in such a survey as this, I must pay some
attention to the warranty cases insofar as they involve such injuries. Let
such matters be the exclusive concern of the surveys in Contracts or Sales
8. 104 Ohio App. 198, 147 N.E.2d 870 (1957). See comment on the previous
decision in Survey, 8 WEST. RES. L. REV. 376 (1957).
9. 152 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
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only insofar as they involve problems of bickering and dickering over
the terms and the performance of contracts for the sale of goods.
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.'0 of course highlights this area.
A lady whose hair and scalp were injured through the use of a home permanent kit was allowed a suit for breach of warranty against the manufacturer. The doctrinal technicalities need not concern us here. Suffice
it to say that Ohio now joins in the trend toward spreading this kind of
risk over the entire consuming public (no matter how much it may understandably hurt the very soul of the defendant lawyer), by imposing
strict liability on manufacturers who seem too much to have been avoiding responsibility for their marketing practices.
The court has not gone all the way, however. Three judges would not
go so far in the Toni case. And in a case decided only weeks previously
to Toni, the court refused to upset the privity bar to a suit, involving an
electric frying pan, brought by a lady who claimed she was hurt -because
of the pan's defective condition.'1 Of course she could have sued the
seller for breach of warranty if she had personally purchased the frying
pan. That is the law, as they say.
A lower court apparently would go even further than Toni. In
Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins' 2 another home permanent kit was
involved. The court would impose liability on the basis of an implied
warranty. Generally speaking, the express warranty found in the Toni
case is a little harder to substantiate. Implied warranties, on the other
hand, need little more than a favorable judicial attitude.
Workmen's Compensation and the New Look in FELA
Two lower court decisions will help to prevent forum shopping in
F JEA. suits. In both Harris v. Penn. Rd. Co. L3 and Barbour v. Baltimore & Ohio Rd. Co.14 will be found implicit approval of the Federal
move to make F.E.JA. an improved form of Workmen's Compensation
with a "more adequate award." The method is simple enough and approved -by the Supreme Court of the United States: send such cases to
juries to find "negligence" on the very slightest of evidence.
On the other hand, the Ohio Supreme Court encourages forum shop10.

167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).

See also 9 WEST. RES. L. 1EV.

511 (1958).
11. Welsh v. Ledyard, 167 Ohio St. 57, 146 N.E.2d 299 (1958).
suit against the dealer, a difference of some significance.
12.
13.
14.

149 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
146 N.E.2d 744 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
152 N.E.2d 134 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
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ping in another kind of case. In Ellis v. Garwood'5 the widow of a
deceased worker was allowed to sue a fellow employee of the deceased,
the person who had allegedly negligently killed her husband in an automobile accident in Ohio. Earlier she had been compensated under the
New York Workmen's Compensation Act because her husband had been
in the course of his employment for his New York employer. That
act provided that her remedy under the act was exclusive. The remedy
under the Ohio act is exclusive only as to the liability of the employer.
Right To Work
While the people of Ohio rejected the so-called Right to Work
measure last November, the Ohio high court had previously given recognition to a tort which might properly be called the invasion of the right
to work. The plaintiff had sued his union and certain of its officials for
conspiring to deprive him of his job. The union protested that Ohio
courts were without jurisdiction to hear a labor relations controversy. But
this was a tort, said the court. Plaintiff was harmed in his relationship
with his employer with a resultant loss of money.16
Hospitals and Causation
Hospitals may no longer be immune from liability for the negligence
of their servants, 'but there are still means available to lower courts to
favor the former immunity. In Kletrovetz v. Grant Hospital'7 the
plaintiff sued the defendant hospital for negligence in failing to place
guards on her bed and thus causing her to fall and suffer damage while
under the influence of a "hynotic dose." Judgment on the pleadings was
given for defendant on the theory that the proximate cause of the injury
must be established by the plaintiff. "Where two or more reasonable
inferences may be drawn from established facts it can not be presumed
that the injury occurred in a manner which would give rise to liability."'"
This reasoning seems to run counter to the usual notion that the test of a
prima facie case is whether a jury might reasonably decide the facts in
plaintiffs favor. Then it becomes the jury's function to determine if
plaintiff has established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
15. 168 Ohio St. 241, 152 N.E.2d 100 (1958). 10 WEST. REs. L. REv. 318
(1959). See also discussion in CONFLICTS section, supra and in WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION section, infra.
16. Perko v. Local No. 207 of International Assoc. of Bridge Structual and Ornamental Iron Workers Union, 168 Ohio St. 16, 151 N.E.2d 742 (1958). See also
ADMINISTRATIvE and LABOR LAW sections, supra.
17. 152 N.E.2d 149 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
18. Id. at 151.

